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'Streaming' services are a new and fast-growing element in media industry eco-
systems – examples include Netflix, YouTube, Amazon Video, and Spotify. For customers, 
these simply represent an additional means of consuming digital content, but for the media 
industry and the scholars that research it, these organisations are complex. They represent not 
only a new technological option for the distribution of content, but also new ways of 
financing and licensing that content, for acquiring audiences and communicating with them, 
for charging for content, and for the creation, categorization, and consumption-analysis of 
content.  
The goal of this paper is to map how these organisations function, investigating in 
particular the core process stages and activity ‘flows’ that form the heart of their services. We 
use Netflix as our example, the first truly global television network and a major streaming 
provider of audio-visual content, mapping in detail how it moves content around the globe 
generating revenue. 
By ‘streaming service’ we mean a service that provides a large menu of audio-visual 
content available immediately on demand over a data network. The majority of streaming 
services charge a subscription fee from their viewers, although some, such as YouTube, are 
financed by interstitial advertisements (mixed funding models combining the two can also be 
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found.) Some services provide only shows produced by the company, the most notable 
example probably being HBO, while most services provide licensed content or a combination 
of the two. 
 
Previous research 
The television industry has changed tremendously since YouTube was launched in 
2005, and Netflix switched to a streaming service in 2007, changes that are described in detail 
by Amanda Lotz (2014; 2017). As a pioneer of a new model for the provision of audio-visual 
content, and as a service that has enjoyed phenomenal growth, Netflix has itself been the 
focus of many studies.  
In the next section of this paper we discuss Netflix’s hybrid status, in that it is both a 
media and a technology organisation.  Much scholarly discussion on Netflix to date addresses 
aspects of this duality, for example how Netflix allows for a nonlinear television (and film1) 
experience, where customers can browse a huge catalogue at will, see (Arnold, 2016; Jenner, 
2016; Johnson, 2017; Lotz, 2014), and on Netflix’s innovations around its automatic 
recommendation engine and how this shapes the viewing experience (Alexander, 2016; Finn, 
2017; Madrigal, 2014; Smith-Rowsey, 2016). Studies of users of Netflix and other streaming 
services are also slowly appearing (Bucher, 2018; Spilker, Ask, & Hansen, 2018). Several 
researchers have followed up on Williams’ long-established observation (1975) that the 
nature of programme formats in part reflects the possibilities of the prevailing technology, 
thus linking changing TV aesthetics with changing technology and new viewer habits, (Lotz, 
2014; Jenner, 2016) 
A growing body of literature discusses how the economy is changing in the television 
industry. This examines  how different actors position themselves strategically in this new 
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landscape (Evens & Donders, 2018; Gimpel, 2015; Hesmondhalgh, 2019; Lobato, 2019; Lotz, 
2017). Several researchers note that control over “the last mile,” i.e., the physical connection 
to the end audience is an important strategic advantage, and that those companies whose 
services bundle internet access with audiovisual content are most likely to succeed 
competitively (Evens & Donders, 2018; Gimpel, 2015). 
Another scholarly discussion that also touches on Netflix is the question of what 
constitutes a media company today, and the implications how a company is categorized has 
on how it is regulated and taxed. Netflix is one of many companies that rely on advanced 
computer technology to deliver its services. Gillespie (2010) argues that Google’s decision to 
label its daughter company YouTube as a technology company rather than a media company 
brings relief from regulatory and tax burdens. Some scholars suggest such companies are in 
fact media companies and should be taxed and regulated as such (Napoli & Caplan, 2017). 
Hesmondhalgh (2019), however, while agreeing that these companies’status allows them to 
avoid regulatory and financial burdens,  argues that companies such as Netflix work in very 
different ways than traditional media companies, and have a very different culture, and thus 
should be seen as technology companies moving into the media industry field.  
The centrality of technology inside these organisation is stressed by Hesmondhalgh, 
and indeed in many studies of internet-distributed television in general, and of Netflix in 
particular, notably on elements such as the automated (“algorithmic”) recommendation 
engines, or the importance of the “last mile”. Fewer studies however have examined the entire 
technological architecture required to deliver these services in their totality. Mention is made 
in Lotz (2014), Lobato (2019), discusses them in more detail but as a backdrop for 
discussions of other issues, and an examination of Netflix’ role in the debate on network 
neutrality can be found in Davies (2016). An example of a more comprehensive analysis of 
streaming technology architecture can be found in Erikson, Fleischer, Snickars, Johannson 
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and Vonderau’s book on Spotify (2019), but notably the authors conclude that Spotify is so 
complex that it is impossible to view in its totality. In this paper, we share  Erikson et.al.’s 
conclusion about the complexity of streaming organisations’ technological systems, drawing 
in part also on on Actor-Network theory (cf. Latour, 2005), but we also argue that while 
Netflix’s technology is indeed highly complex, it is possible to create an abstract model of it 
that can assist our understanding of the company’s workings, and draw conclusions on its 
potential impact on the wider media industry. 
Method and research approach 
Streaming video services are a new actor in the media eco-system and developing fast.  
While they receive exhaustive coverage in the business press, they are under-researched from 
a scholarly perspective. This may stem from their emergent nature, and from the fact they are 
hard to fit into existing media management industry typologies.  While players in the 
streaming industry tend to be grouped together into a segment, perhaps because they have 
streamed media content at the heart of their activities, they exhibit a high level of diversity – 
extending from business rationales and funding basis, to business models and value 
propositions.  
While all are variants of media companies, some are also platforms; while all produce 
and distribute media content, they all have significant technological competencies and 
infrastructures to the extent that they are as much technology organisations as they are media 
ones; some, like YouTube, Amazon Video and HBO Now, are divisions of large 
conglomerates and others, such as Netflix, Spotify and Hulu, are standalone businesses; their 
content can be provided by professional third-parties, original to them, or created by users; 
they compete with national linear broadcast offers on a global basis (radio and television), 
with services for downloading and saving media content (iTunes), and with the purchase of 
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media content (CDs, boxed sets).  
This has two implications for this paper. First, because one goal is to map the core 
processes in this new media business model, it reduces complexity by focusing on a single 
streaming media organisation, Netflix, which served as a single ‘exemplary’ (Yin, 1994) and 
‘instrumental case’ (Stake, 1995), meaning that it has the potential to provide insight into a 
number of substantive issues.  Netflix was chosen because it is a standalone entity (unlike, 
say, YouTube or Amazon Prime Video), with a focused and clearly delineated product offer, 
and is publicly listed (meaning financial data is available). In addition, it follows a relatively 
open corporate communications policy. 
The second implication is that because streaming media players in general and Netflix 
in particular are evolving fast, and because their activities undercut existing sector boundaries 
and definitions, no single theoretical lens or research stream emerged as most relevant to 
analyse the phenomena under review. This paper therefore employs an exploratory approach 
and draws on a number of different theoretical concepts in its discussion. Empirical data was 
from drawn secondary sources: industry reports (Soper, 2017), press accounts (Wong, 2016; 
Stokke, 2013; Madrigal, 2014), tech blogs (Hoff, 2012; Ueland, 2015), and company 
documentation (Netflix, 2016). Valuable pointers and insights were also drawn from three 
semi-structured interviews during the winter of 2018 with developers in Vimond, a company 
that delivers streaming technology services to broadcasters worldwide. 
This study represents an initial stage of a larger project that explores how streaming 
technology is influencing the audio-visual content sector, specifically how it changes how 
value is created and distributed. This larger project will additionally analyse the technologies 
employed and the actors involved.2    
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Context  
Streaming media distribution services are a recent and popular phenomenon. Between 
2011 and 2016, the subscription streaming services market in Europe grew by 128% annually 
(Grece, 2017).  In the US, over half of all households subscribed to a paid streaming service 
as of April 2017, and Netflix had half of the country’s household as its customers (Statista, 
2017).  In Scandinavia, penetration is equally high, with Norway in the lead, where 61% of 
households subscribed to paid streaming as of the end of 2016 (Grece, 2017). 
Customers cite access to exclusive content and ease of use as prime reasons for 
subscribing to streaming services. ‘Ease of use’ has many dimensions. These include the 
ability to watch regardless of television schedules (“time shifting”), the option to view several 
episodes of a show in one sitting (“binge-watching”).  In the UK in 2017, Ofcom found that 
79% of adults used streaming services to “binge-watch” television. 
About Netflix  
Founded in 1997 as an online DVD mail-order rental service, Netflix is now a global 
movie and TV series entertainment network, offering streamed content on subscription basis 
on any internet-connected screen (Finn, 2017). The value proposition is flat fee, on-demand, 
unlimited and advertising free consumption and no-hassle online cancellation – members can 
leave and re-join when they want.  
The proposition proved compelling. Netflix moved into profit in 2003 and into the 
internet streaming of movies in 2007.  In 2011 the DVD and online businesses were split and 
Netflix also moved into original programming. In the same year Reed Hastings was named 
CEO of the Year by Fortune magazine.  Netflix has expanded internationally progressively, 
and now operates in 190 countries, reaching 125 million subscribers worldwide as of April 
2018.  Turnover has grown consistently since 2008 and in 2017 was $11.69 bn having 
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increased 32.4% on the previous year (Netflix, 2018).  Although the company is profitable, its 
cash flow is negative. In 2018 it plans to spend $8 bn on content which will include 700 
original TV shows, including 80 non-English language original productions from outside the 
US. In comparison, Hulu spent $2.5 bn on content in 2017, NBCUniversal $10.2 bn and 
Disney $7.8 bn, while Apple plans to spend $1 bn in 2018 (Patel, 2018). Netflix’s investments 
in original content production are financed via long-term debt (Netflix, 2018b).  The company 
is listed on Nasdaq, and its shares are held mainly by institutional investors. 
Netflix may be described as a platform business and a network business. As a 
platform, its central purpose is to ‘match’ users and facilitate the exchange of goods and 
services, thereby creating value for all participants (Rochet & Tirole, 2003; Evans & 
Schmalensee, 2016; Parker, Van Alstyne and Choudary, 2016).  Platform businesses grow 
and thrive, not by acquiring other businesses or fixed assets, but by connecting more and 
more users within their networks.  
Networked environments exhibit particular characteristics (Arthur, 1994; Shapiro and 
Varian, 1999):  the value of a product to one user depends on how many other users there are 
(known as ‘network externalities’), so the value to users increases as more users join, and 
scale effects mean that as the number of users grow, the costs of serving each user decline, 
improving profit margins. These effects only kick in if the network grows substantially, so 
network business like Netflix need to grow fast, or ‘scale’.  
This central mechanism influences many aspects of Netflix’s strategy and value 
proposition (Küng, 2017). It mandates fast growth, thus Netflix’s rapid international 
expansion. That growth is taking place in markets that already have significant free-to-air 
provision, mandating an emphasis on a wide range of content, that is as exclusive as possible, 
and can justify a subscription fee.  Attracting new customers and keeping them mandates a 
user experience that is straightforward, featuring easy selection, the ability for multiple 
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household members to receive different content, seamless viewing across different devices, 
and a personalized user interface that learns and makes recommendations based on prior 
selections, and offers control over when to play/pause/resume, any screen. 
  Netflix is not however a classic double-sided platform, in that it is not a marketplace 
that connects buyers and sellers (like, say, YouTube which matches content from millions of 
producers to audiences and advertisers).  Netflix’s network characteristics derive from its 
large-scale analysis of users’ interactions, which it uses both to algorithmically tailor-make 
recommendations for each individual user and to decide which new series and films to 
commission. Analysing the consumption behaviour of users, Netflix’ algorithms identify 
those that have similar tastes, and uses these insights to refine the suggestions. Network 
externalities therefore take the form of spillover benefits where the participants in a network 
benefit from interactions that they were not personally involved in through better 
programming and more accurate recommendations.  
From these factors stem other aspects of business model and strategy.  Netflix invests 
heavily in content acquisition and marketing to drive subscriber growth and retention - in 
2018 it will invest $8 billion in content acquisition and £2 billion in marketing (Netflix, 
2018). It keeps its subscription price low and pricing model simple model to reduce barriers 
to entry and friction in sign up.  It invests significantly in technology to ensure quality of user 
experience (although some tech services are provided by third parties, as discussed below), 
and not least in the data analytics competence at the heart of its business model.  
The basic model of streaming video service 
While individual companies exhibit differences, streaming video services share a 
common technological setup that combines five different stages and taken together these form 
a network of actors (‘actors’ here meaning firms or groups of firms that deliver similar 
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services). Figure 1 below presents a simplified depiction of this. 
 
Figure 1: Core stages and actors of Netflix’s streaming video service, annotated with key 
external partners3 
Acquisition from Content Providers  
In each market content Netflix licenses content from multiple suppliers. It bids for 
exclusive rights to SVOD rights against cable and broadcast networks and online suppliers, 
typically buying multi-year exclusive SVOD licenses. At time of renewal it evaluates 
viewing, as well as number of similar titles, to determine whether it will re-buy and how 
much it is willing to pay. Payments are fixed and not scaled according to number of 
subscriptions or viewership figures. 
Netflix also commissions its own original content and these investments have grown 
progressively.  This started with the scripted series Lillyhammer and House of Cards in 2012 
(the first ‘Netflix Originals’, cf. Moore, 2016) and moved on to movies.  A unique dimension 
of this content is that insights from its analyses of actual viewer habits are central to 
commissioning decisions (Finn, 2017, Smith & Telang, 2016; Fritz, 2012; Vanderbilt, 2013).  
This strategy has been successful and its original series such as Orange is the New Black and 
House of Cards have garnered both viewers and an enormous buzz in the media.  The 
strategic rationale for this is a belief that original content strengthens the brand and drives up 
viewing hours.  In practice, it reflects the fact that the OTT offers in the market are 
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remarkably similar which undermines their value and encourages switching.  Original content 
therefore creates both strategic differentiation and lock-in, where subscribers ‘hooked’ on 
particular content and on a series and are unlikely to cancel their subscription (Küng, 2017).  
Further, because Netflix doesn’t need massive opening night audiences, it can experiment 
with niche products and diverse storylines, since its aggregates viewership over a long period 
fuelled by word of mouth promotion. 
Netflix 
The ‘Netflix’ stage in Figure 1 contains computational processes that the company 
performs on video files as soon as they are acquired. These includes transcoding and 
fragmentation, and data analysis of video content and profiles and behaviours of users, which 
taken together are used to generate personalised recommendations.  These are independent 
processes (but have been grouped in the figure for the purposes of clarity) and break down as 
follows:  
Transcoding and fragmentation 
 Netflix’s content is consumed on a wide variety of screens (see below). To cater for 
these many different versions of each video file are required. They are scaled to different 
sizes, and also versioned for different ‘codecs’ (‘codec’ is short for coder-decoder, the 
protocol for coding and compressing video into bits).  The process of creating these different 
video files, more than a hundred different versions for every television episode, is called 
‘transcoding’ and is the part of video streaming that requires the most computer processing 
power. Netflix has ‘migrated’ this computation to Amazon’s AWS cloud computing service.  
Netflix subscribers can continue watching from where they left off, even if they 
switch devices.  To achieve uninterrupted streaming in varying bandwidths, on different 
hardware, all the video files in different sizes and codecs are stored as short fragments in 
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dedicated “fragment servers”. These processes are also cloud based and performed using 
AWS. 
Video analysis, user analysis, and recommendations 
Netflix seeks to put the viewer in control of consumption. This means, as CEO Reed 
Hastings explained, “It’s fundamental to that control orientation that we don’t cram 
advertising down viewers’ throats” (cited in Wu, 2016; 329). Thus, data analytics lies at the 
heart of its business model. This activity combines machine learning and algorithms with 
human intelligence.  Users’ viewing habits are tracked and analysed. In addition, large teams 
of people have been trained to analyse and tag Netflix content with metadata to create a 
database with fine-grained descriptors of every offer. These product attributes range from the 
obvious (plot, actors, genres, period and so on) to the subjective (moral status of characters, 
degree of plot resolution), and combined they form a matrix of close to 77 000 classes or 
“micro-genres” (Madrigal, 2014; Finn, 2017). 
When the tags are combined with customer intelligence derived from analysis of 
viewing habits, Netflix can develop personalised recommendations that resonate closely with 
members’ viewing preferences. Netflix is also using insights from this competence to 
commission content itself (a significant departure from the piloting process standard for the 
development of scripted entertainment products).  This process is also computing intensive 
and performed in the cloud.  
According to the resource-based view of strategy (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) 
Netflix’s competence in data analytics is a strategic capability that creates competitive 
advantage and allows it to achieve superior returns. It meets the so-called VRIN criteria in 
that it is ‘valuable’ – provides rents and is a source of differentiation, rare – the capability is 
exceptional rather than standard, inimitable – rivals would find it hard to replicate to this 
Mapping the core actors and flows 13 
standards and non-substitutable (creating a significant competitive barrier for traditional 
national broadcasters seeking to compete with streaming services in their home markets).  
Primary Distribution 
In contrast to traditional broadcasting, which is mainly national in reach, the major 
streaming services are global. To allow for efficient delivery of video in all countries, Netflix 
and other major streaming services rely on content delivery networks (CDN).  These are 
central elements of streaming services, and new to media distribution systems.   
A CDN is a network with its own cables running in parallel with the internet, 
connecting servers in metropolitan areas on every continent. When a viewer in Norway 
requests an episode of House of Cards, that episode is not transferred from California, but via 
a CDN from a server in Germany to the hub closest to the user, where the stream is connected 
to the regular, open internet.  Several commercial CDNs exist, powered by large technology 
companies such as Akamai, Limelight Networks, Microsoft and Amazon CloudFront, with 
sophisticated business models and pricing strategies (Hosanager, 2008; Popescu et.al., 2018). 
Both Netflix and Google (owner of YouTube) operate their own CDNs to ensure quality of 
service and minimal latency. As with other tech elements in streaming services, CDNs 
involve intense computing and consume considerable amounts of energy (Popescu, Yao, & 
Ilie, 2018). Netflix alone is reported to account for over a third of all internet traffic. 
Secondary Distribution - “the last mile”.  
The final delivery to subscribers is done by consumers’ broadband internet connection 
- optical fibre, television cable, telephone line (twisted pair), mobile telephone network, or 
another technology (in Netflix parlance, this stage is known as a ‘service household’.)   
The streaming service provider pays for the video flow until it reaches ‘the last mile’. 
At this point, neither the streaming service nor the larger tech companies ‘own’ the video flow 
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as it belongs to the internet service provider and is paid for by subscribers via their own 
connection to the network.   
Netflix’s CDN offers an ‘Open Connect Program’ under which Netflix installs its own 
servers at no cost in ISPs’ data centres which are directly connected to the Netflix network. 
Some large ISPs have tried, unsuccessfully, to charge Netflix interconnection fees for 
‘prioritised access’to their networks.  
Devices 
Netflix’s content can be viewed on a myriad of devices (the company claims to 
support 200 different ones).  Mobile viewing is growing in popularity, but streaming video is 
also consumed on computers, on large screens (‘smart TV’ sets have applications for 
watching major streaming services such as Netflix, and also have a “set-top box” in between, 
(as an Apple TV, a Chromecast player) or one provided by the cable access provider. Gaming 
consoles are also used to connect the television screen to the streaming service (platforms 
such as Nintendo’s PlayStation and Microsoft’s XBox ship with apps for Netflix, YouTube, 
and other services). 
Netflix must ensure its content works on a diverse range of screens.  Differences 
concern not only the size of the screen (which range in diameter from a few centimetres to 
over a meter) but also in terms of screen resolution (the number of pixels contained within the 
screen). A mobile phone may actually have higher resolution than a 50-inch TV screen.   
Further, because computer screens come in many sizes, and viewers switch frequently 
between screens, the window for video playback needs to be able to resize fluidly at any time.  
Activity flows between the five classes of actors 
A streaming media service, such as Netflix, has five core stages involving a network 
of actors, as discussed above and shown in Figure 1.  In addition to this are a number of 
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‘activity flows’, which also constitute building blocks of the system, and which in addition 
also encapsulate many of the fundamental differences between streaming and legacy 
broadcasting models. These were identified the using ERAF actor network analysis, which 
maps Entities, Relations, Attributes, and Flows (Kumar, 2013) and are the: (1) video content 
flow, (2) the intellectual property rights management flow (3) the value capture flow and (4) 
the flow concerned with control, data capture and analysis.  
The video content flow (from content producer to end user via the streaming service, 
primary distribution, and secondary distribution), is analysed in the preceding section of this 
paper. Below we analyse the other three  flows.  
IP Rights Flow 
Video streaming is at its core also an intellectual property rights business.  Streaming 
services like Netflix broker access to libraries of media content. They can be viewed as ‘legal’ 
incarnations of the pirate sites (such as PirateBay or PopcornTime) which provided similar 
libraries of content, illegally (Spilker, 2017). Illegal services apart, for traditional 
broadcasting systems, IP rights have traditionally been negotiated per each national market.   
Netflix negotiates terms with copyright holders to rent IP rights for a certain period of 
time.  For Netflix, as for traditional broadcasters and television networks, this involves 
creating contracts and making payments. When customers initiate a content stream, in parallel 
to the video flow a transfer of rights from producer to streaming service, and then to the end 
viewer takes place (see Figure 2), supported by login mechanisms and databases that check 
each viewers' subscription and place of residence. We have not described these authentication 
processes in detail here, but they are advanced, and central for trust in the whole system.  The 
nature of this flow represents a significant departure from the IP management systems found 
in legacy broadcasting systems. 
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Figure 2: Video flow (green) and IP rights flow (pink). 
Value Capture Flow 
Netflix charges its subscribers a monthly fee and this revenue needs to be billed, 
received, recorded, exchanged into other currencies, and distributed between other partners in 
the network.  Netflix’s international billing infrastructure has been migrated to Amazon’s 
AWS service. This includes transactions and compliance activities. The value capture flow is 
mapped in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Value capture flow (blue) 
Netflix has, as mentioned above, invested heavily in content acquisition, and the 
revenue from its subscription base has not been enough to cover these costs, it is financed 
through long-time debt. Netflix also needs to pay for primary distribution, which it has chosen 
to develop itself, instead of using the services of one of the many actors in this market. In 
addition, Netflix relies on Amazon Web Services for all its heavy computing, which also is a 
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cost (not drawn in Figure 3). 
End users do not only pay for their Netflix subscription, they also finance the two 
classes of actors closest to themselves: devices and secondary distribution. Users buy all their 
different screens and set-top boxes, and they also need to subscribe to an internet service, 
whether wired or wireless.  
Data Capture and Analysis Flow 
The last flow is the data flow. All actors in the network collect data from the other 
actors, although Netflix clearly is the most data-centric of them all. Netflix collects metadata 
about the films from the content providers. It logs all interactions between users and their 
systems, and use them to provide recommendations, as mentioned earlier. These 
recommendations are valuable data for users, as they help them navigate Netflix’ vast 
catalogue.  
 
Figure 4: Data flows in the network 
But the other actors also collect data. Most, if not all, of the devices used to view 
Netflix can collect data on use and transmit this to the producer. When we watch Netflix on 
an Apple TV, Apple captures this data, and the 2018 version of the Apple TV OS will include 
Netflix favourites in its own recommendations in the device’s “TV app”. Internet and mobile 
service providers (secondary distribution) collect traffic data to ensure service quality, but 
also to guide pricing strategies. Content Delivery Networks’ (primary distribution) role is to 
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swiftly move large files across oceans as requested by users, and they devote considerable 
computing recourses to find the optimal route for large files, depending on where the desired 
files are stored, where the user is, and how much traffic there is in the network at any time. 
Content providers are most likely the least data-centric of the actors, but even they may 
collect data on use in order to check if they are paid correctly, and to use viewing preferences 
as input when they create new episodes. 
Discussion 
The streaming media providers are new and important actors in media systems. 
Taking Netflix as an example, this paper has mapped how one example of such an 
organisation functions, identifying the core process stages and the central activity ‘flows’ in 
the organisation’s network, and discussed their inter-relationship with business model and 
value proposition, and explored the influence of network externalities on those elements.  
Identifying core process stages and flows, in conjunction with strategy and value 
proposition, has therefore provided valuable insight into how streaming services function. The 
research also raises some fundamental issues, which have implications for understanding 
existing audio-visual content sectors, and media management scholarship.  
While streaming media organisations share similarities - in terms of their core process 
stages, and because all are engaged in the provision of media content - they also exhibit a high 
degree of heterogeneity. This raises a fundamental question.  Although these organisations 
operate in a similar way and supply similar services, in fundamental aspects they are not 
similar at all. Is it analytically valid therefore, to group streaming media service providers into 
a single category? In at least one aspect, the technical setup, it seems to be a valid category. 
As discussed above Erikson, Fleischer, Johansson, Snickars, & Vonderau's 2019 study of the 
music streaming service Spotify ‘map’ this service in a way similar to the depiction provided 
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in this paper. Despite a number of intrinsic differences, it is clear that Spotify and Netflix rely 
on very similar technology. Just as “broadcasting” in the 1980ies could be used as shorthand 
for a complex, but standard, collection of technologies of production and distribution, it 
seems likely that what we mapped in this paper is a fairly standard “streaming” setup. 
Still, or because of this, streaming media organisations like Netflix are difficult to 
categorise using existing typologies. As observed earlier, they are neither media companies, 
nor tech companies, but tech-media hybrids. For Netflix, as for Spotify and YouTube, 
technology is at the core of all central activities and its bases of competitive differentiation, 
and the centrality of technological and data competencies inside these organisations, and as 
such is a further indication of the ascendancy of technology in the media industry (see Küng, 
2017).  For Netflix, first among equal of these technological processes are those involving 
data collection and analysis, and competitive performance is dependent on the quality of 
these. Core activities are data informed – from deciding which content to acquire or produce, 
to making creative decisions about that content, to setting prices, to ensuring an optimal 
match between subscribers and content.  
The analysis points out that Netflix has characteristics of a network and of a platform. 
This applies to actors in three out of five core process stages the paper identifies (all but 
content providers and end users) are ‘platforms’ or multi-sided markets (Rochet & Tirole, 
2003; Evans, Hagiu & Schmalensee, 2006; Gawer, 2014). Devices are platforms - Apple TV 
brings together users and many streaming services, an Android phone connects both service 
providers and app programmers with an audience. Service providers, connect end users with 
all kinds of internet services. Content delivery networks connect anyone with a popular web 
site or another service with a lot of traffic with their audiences also through traffic spikes. 
There is ambiguity in establishing firm boundaries also. Despite its size, Netflix is 
surprisingly reliant on external partners and core processes. In the risk analysis section of its 
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2018 Annual Report Netflix delineates its reliance on cable, satellite and communications 
operators, on third-party CDNs, and on Amazon Web Services which ‘runs the vast majority 
of our computing’ (Netflix, 2018: 8).  Indeed, each of the streaming organisations combines 
home-built and external elements in different ways, and the rationale is higher quality or 
reliability of service, and a desire not to have to bear the cost of developing their own 
infrastructure. This phenomenon is hard to interpret. It is an example of co-opetition 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996), but also can be viewed as reflecting an industrywide 
shift towards using cloud computing and ‘software as-a-service ‘(SaaS) for technology 
infrastructures. (Fox & Patterson, 2014) 
Thus, while the temptation for those within the media sector is to evaluate these 
against existing categorisations of legacy players in the media industry, this paper finds that 
they are in fact ‘new beasts,’ echoing some aspects of Hesmondhalgh’s (2019) position. To 
analyse these players primarily in terms of their ‘difference’ to legacy competitors - the case 
of Netflix versus the national broadcast networks or movie studios – is be to overlook critical 
dimensions of differentness and perhaps falsely categorise them. One example is the reliance 
on data collected in what we term the “data flow”. These data are a central part of Netflix’s 
value proposition and source of competitive advantage. In today’s increasingly digital media 
systems, it could be argued that all media organisations are making increasing use of user data 
to inform decisions, and regard this data as an important strategic asset, yet relatively few of 
these are organised in such a way that the ‘data flow’ is at the core of their operations, 
reflecting that legacy players have needed to retrofit data capture and analysis functions on to 
existing operations in a way that new players such as Netflix have not had to. By extension, 
while Netflix has one foot into the television and film industries, it has another in the data 
science industry, as does many of its co-opetitors such as Amazon or YouTube. 
A final point concerns regulation.  Scholarly discussion of the challenges these 
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players’ tech-media hybrid status creates for regulatory and tax regimes is mentioned earlier 
in this paper.  A conclusion to be drawn from this study is that to resolve these issues it may 
be necessary to adopt a non-binary approach.  Streamed service providers are media nor tech 
but rather a new entity of organisation that cannot be easily accommodated inside existing 
definitions. Because of their disruptive potential for domestic content producers in national 
markets, and for national media systems, it is important to understand what they are and how 
they function.  Streaming media providers are not subject to media content regulation in the 
same way as traditional media players, and indeed in the widest sense, regulatory structures 
have yet to adapt to these new entities – ensuring that not just media scholars but also media 
regulators and policy makers understand these new organisations, their role and their power, 
will be central to ensuring plurality in media systems, particularly at national level.   
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank Terje Colbjørnsen for the helpful conversations about 
different possible ways of drawing maps of complex streaming services. This research was 
funded by the Norwegian Research Council, project number 263076/F10. 
 
References 
Arthur, B. (1994). Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. Chicago: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Barney, J.B. (1991). ‘Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage’, Journal of 
Management, 17(1): 99–120. 
Alexander, N. (2016). Catered to your future self: Neflix’s “predictive personalization” and 
the mathematization of taste. In K. McDonald & D. Smith-Rowsey (Eds.), The Netflix 
Mapping the core actors and flows 22 
effect: Technology and entertainment in the 21st century (pp. 81-97). New York: 
Bloomsbury.  
Arnold, S. (2016). Netflix and the myth of choice/participation/autonomy. In K. McDonald & 
D. Smith-Rowsey (Eds.), The Netflix effect: Technology and entertainment in the 21st 
century (pp. 49-62). New York: Bloomsbury.  
Barney, J.B. (1991). ‘Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage’, Journal of 
Management, 17(1): 99–120. 
Brandenburger, A. and Nalebuff, B (1996). Co-opetition: A Revolution Mindset that 
Combines Competition and Cooperation. New York: Doubleday 
Bucher, T. (2018). If…then: Algorithmic power and politics. New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
Content Delivery Networks. Retrieved 29 May, 2019 from https://www.cdnplanet.com/cdns/ 
Davies, L. (2016). Netflix and the coalition for an open internet. In K. McDonald & D. Smith-
Rowsey (Eds.), The Netflix effect: Technology and entertainment in the 21st century 
(pp. 15-31). New York: Bloomsbury.  
Datta, H., Knox, G., & Bronnenberg, B. J. (2017). Changing their tune: How consumers’ 
adoption of online streaming affects music consumption and discovery. Marketing 
Science, 37(1), 5-21.  
Erikson, M., Fleischer, R., Johansson, A., Snickars, P., & Vonderau, P. (2019). Spotify 
teardown: Inside the black box of music streaming. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press.  
Evans, D. S., Hagiu, A., & Schmalensee, R. (2006). Invisible engines: How software 
platforms drive innovation and transform industries. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press.  
Evans, D. S., & Schmalensee, R. (2016). Matchmakers: the new economics of multisided 
Mapping the core actors and flows 23 
platforms. Harvard Business Review Press.  
Evens, T., & Donders, K. (2018). Platform power and policy in transforming television 
markets. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Fritz, B. (2012), 'Cadre of film buffs helps Netflix viewers sort through the clutter', Los 
Angeles Times, 3 September 2012: 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/03/business/la-fi-0903-ct-netflix-taggers-
20120903 (accessed 10 May 2018).,  
Finn, E. (2017). What algorithms want: Imagination in the age of computing (Kindle ed.). 
Cambridge, Massachusettes: MIT Press.  
Fox, A., & Patterson, D. (2014). Engineering Software as a Service: An Agile Approach 
Using Cloud Computing. N.P.: Strawberry Canyon LLC.  
Gawer, A. (2014). Bridging different perspectives on technological platforms: Towards an 
integrative framework. Research Policy, 43(7), 1239-1249. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.03.006 
Gillespie, T. (2010). The politics of ‘platforms’. New Media & Society, 12(3), 347-364. 
doi:10.1177/1461444809342738 
Gimpel, G. (2015). The Future of Video Platforms: Key Questions Shaping the TV and Video 
Industry. International Journal on Media Management, 17(1), 25-46. 
doi:10.1080/14241277.2015.1014039 
Google video quality report. Retrieved 29 May, 2019 from 
https://www.google.com/get/videoqualityreport/#how_video_gets_to_you 
Grece, C. (2017). Trends in the EU SVOD market. Strasbourg: European Audiovisual 
Observatory. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/trends-in-the-eu-svod-market-nov-
2017/16807899ab 
Hesmondhalgh, D. (2019). The cultural industries (4th ed.). Los Angeles: Sage.  
Mapping the core actors and flows 24 
Hosanagar, K. (2008). CDN Pricing. In R. Buyya, M. Pathan, & A. Vakali (Eds.), Content 
delivery networks (pp. 211-234). Berlin: Springer.  
Hoff, T. (2012). 7 years of YouTube scalability lessons in 30 minutes. Retrieved 29 May, 
2019 from http://highscalability.com/blog/2012/3/26/7-years-of-youtube-scalability-
lessons-in-30-minutes.html 
Jenner, M. (2016). Is this TVIV? On Netflix, TVIII and binge-watching. New Media & 
Society, 18(2), 257-273. doi:10.1177/1461444814541523 
Johnson, C. (2017). Beyond catch-up: VoD interfaces, ITV Hub and the repositioning of 
television online. Critical Studies in Television, 12(2), 121-138. 
doi:10.1177/1749602017698159 
Kumar, V. (2013). 101 Design methods: A structured approach for driving innovation in your 
organization. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley.  
Küng, L. (2017). Strategic Management in the Media. Theory to Practice. London, Sage. 
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: An introduction to Actor-network-theory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Lobato, R. (2019). Netflix nations: The geography of digital distribution. New York: NYU 
Press.  
Levy, S. (2011). In the plex: How Google thinks, works, and shapes our lives (Kindle ed.). 
New York: Simon & Schuster.  
Lotz, A. (2017). Portals: A treatise on Internet-distributed television. Ann Arbor, MI: 
Michigan Publishing. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/mpub.9699689 
Lotz, A. (2014). The television will be revolutionized (Second ed.). New York: NYU Press.  
Madrigal, A. C. (2014). How Netflix reverse engineered Hollywood. The Atlantic.  
Moore, K. (2016). What was the first Netflix Original? What's on Netflix March 28, 2016. 
https://www.whats-on-netflix.com/news/first-netflix-original/ 
Mapping the core actors and flows 25 
Napoli, P., & Caplan, R. (2017). Why media companies insist they’re not media companies, 
why they’re wrong, and why it matters. First Monday, 22(5). 
doi:https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v22i5.7051 
Netflix (2016). How Netflix works with ISPs around the globe to deliver a great viewing 
experience. Retrieved from https://media.netflix.com/en/company-blog/how-netflix-
works-with-isps-around-the-globe-to-deliver-a-great-viewing-experience 
Netflix (2018), Annual Report for the Fiscal Year ended December 31, 2017, 
https://ir.netflix.com/annual-reports (accessed 10 May, 2018) 
Netflix (2018b), Netflix Inc at Morgan Stanley Technology, Media & Telecom Conference on 
February 27, 2018 ir.netflix.com/static-files/651c7f34-1bd3-4fc3-b906-08a5e95ffeb9, 
accessed 10 May, 2018 
Ofcom (2017). Communications market report 2017. London: Ofcom. Retrieved from 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-and-data/multi-sector-research/cmr/cmr-2017 
Patel, S. (2018). 'Netflix's deal terms pose a conundrum for TV studios'. Digiday.com: 
https://digiday.com/media/netflixs-deal-terms-pose-a-conundrum-for-tv-studios/ 
(accessed 19 March 2018. 
Parker, G. G., Van Alstyne, M. W., Choudary, S. P. (2016). Platform Revolution. How 
networked markets are transforming the economy and how to make them work for you. 
New York: Norton. 
Popescu, A., Yao, Y., & Ilie, D. (2018). Video distribution networks: Architecture and system 
requirements. In A. Popescu (Ed.), Greening video distribution networks, computer 
communications and networks. Springer. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-
71718-0_1 
Rochet, J., & Tirole, J. (2003). Platform competition in two‐sided markets. Journal of the 
european economic association, 1(4), 990-1029. doi:10.1162/154247603322493212] 
Mapping the core actors and flows 26 
Shapiro, C. and Varian, H.R. (1999). Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network 
Economy. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Stake, R. E. (1995). The Art of Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks, Sage. 
Smith, M.D. & Telang, R. (2016). Streaming, sharing, stealing: big data and the future of 
entertainment. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Smith-Rowsey, D. (2016). Imaginative indices and deceptive domains: How Netflix’s 
categories and genres redefine the long tail. In K. McDonald & D. Smith-Rowsey 
(Eds.), The Netflix effect: Technology and entertainment in the 21st century (pp. 63-
79). New York: Bloomsbury.  
Soper, T. (2017, December 20). Future of live sports? How Amazon streamed NFL games to 
200 countries and 600 types of devices. GeekWire. Retrieved from 
https://www.geekwire.com/2017/future-live-sports-amazon-streamed-nfl-games-200-
countries-600-types-devices/ 
Spilker, H. (2017). Digital music distribution: The sociology of online music streams. 
London: Routledge.  
Spilker, H. S., Ask, K., & Hansen, M. (2018). The new practices and infrastructures of 
participation: how the popularity of Twitch.tv challenges old and new ideas about 
television viewing. Information, Communication & Society, 1-16. 
doi:10.1080/1369118x.2018.1529193 
Statista (2017). Number of subscribers of selected SVoD services in Norway in December 
2017 (in 1,000s). https://www.statista.com/statistics/981184/number-of-subscribers-
of-selected-svod-services-in-norway/ 
Stokke, O. P. B. (2013, 25 January). Netflix Super HD i Norge. DinSide. Retrieved from 
https://www.dinside.no/data/netflix-super-hd-i-norge/61301161 
Ueland, C. (2015). The stack behind Netflix scaling. Retrieved 12 June, 2019 from 
Mapping the core actors and flows 27 
https://www.scalescale.com/the-stack-behind-netflix-scaling/ 
van Dijck, J. (2013). The Culture of Connectivity: A critical history of social media (Kindle 
ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Vanderbilt, T. (2013). 'The science behind the Netflix algorithms that decide what you'll 
watch next', Wired, http:www.wired.com/2013/08/qq_netflixalgorithm (accessed 1 
December 2014). 
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). ‘A resource-based view of the firm’, Strategic Management Journal, 5: 
171–80. 
Williams, R. (1975). Television: Technology and Cultural Form. New York: Schocken.  
Wong, J. I. (2016). The internet has been quietly rewired, and video is the reason why. 
Quartz. Retrieved from https://qz.com/742474/how-streaming-video-changed-the-
shape-of-the-internet/ 
Wu, T. (2016). The Attention Merchants: From the daily newspaper to social media, how our 
time and attention is harvested and sold. London: Atlantic Books. 






1 For the sake of clarity, we will treat Netflix as a television company and part of the 
television industry. That is a huge simplification, as a large part of its catalog is films, and as 
such, Netflix is also an important player in the film industry. However, as the focus of this 
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paper is the technology, we have simplified these industry descriptions. 
2 Details on the project is found on https://bit.ly/streamproject 
3 This depiction builds on a representation by Scalescale 
(https://www.scalescale.com/the-stack-behind-netflix-scaling/), also incorporating elements 
from Popescu et.al (2018) and authors’ own research. 
